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Multiple actualities and ontically vague identity 
J.R.G.Williams1
 
Gareth Evans's argument against ontically vague identity has been picked over on many occasions. But 
extant proposals for blocking the argument do not meet well-motivated general constraints on a 
successful solution. Moreover, the pivotal position that defending ontically vague identity occupies vis 
a vis ontic vagueness more generally has not yet been fully appreciated. This paper advocates a way of 
resisting the Evans argument meeting all the mentioned constraints: if we can find referential 
indeterminacy in virtue of ontic vagueness, we can get out of the Evans argument while still preserving 
genuinely ontically vague identity. To show how this approach can vindicate particular cases of 
ontically vague identity, I develop a framework for describing ontic vagueness in general in terms of 
multiple actualities. The effect, overall, is to provide a principled and attractive approach to ontically 
vague identity that is immune from Evansian worries. 
 
 
Gareth Evans's (1978) argument against ontically vague identity has been picked over 
on many occasions.2 But extant responses do not meet well-motivated general 
constraints on a successful solution. I argue for a form of response that requires no 
logical revisionism, allows us to preserve compelling metaphysical principles such as 
the indiscernability of identicals, which works against the argument in its strongest 
form, and which genuinely delivers ontically vague identities. I present the resolution 
by developing a general framework for understanding ontic vagueness: multiple 
actualities. 
 
The paper falls into five sections. In the first I present Evans argument, and argue for 
a series of constraints on a successful response. In the second section, I look at what is 
at stake in the Evans argument, highlighting the practical and metaphysical 
significance of ontically vague identities. I provide arguments that other forms of 
ontic vagueness entail ontically vague identities, so that if the latter is proved 
incoherent, ontically vague existence and ontically vague instantiation must also be 
given up. I argue on this basis that Evans' argument, if successful, gives good reason 
for us to believe microphysicalism. In the third section, I describe an in principle 
loophole in the Evans argument: if we can find referential indeterminacy in virtue of 
ontic vagueness, we can get out of the Evans argument while still preserving ontically 
vague identities in the sense that is important to the wider concerns described in 
section 2. Section 4 develops the framework for describing ontic vagueness in general 
in terms of multiple actualities; and section 5 applies this to paradigmatic cases of 
vague identity. The effect, overall, is to provide a principled and attractive approach 
to ontically vague identity that is immune from Evansian worries. 
 
1. Evans' argument against ontically vague identity 
 
The core of Evans' argument against vague identity is disarming in its simplicity: 
 
                                                 
1 This paper was presented at a Leeds Work in Progress seminar: thanks to all concerned for extremely 
helpful discussion. I owe especial thanks for discussion of material here to Ross Cameron, Andrew 
McGonigal. My greatest debt is to Elizabeth Barnes, whose work on ontic vagueness made me start 
thinking about these issues in detail, and whose ideas have influenced my ways of thinking of the 
matter tremendously. 
2 Some highlights: Thomason (1982), Noonan (2004, 1990, 1982, 1984), Broome (1984), Lewis 
(1988), Parsons and Woodruff (1995). For a fuller set 
of references to the literature, see section 8 of Williamson (2003). 
1. It is indeterminate whether A is identical to B 
2. A has the property of being indeterminately identical to B  (from 1) 
3. It is not indeterminate whether B is identical to B 
4. B does not have the property of being indeterminately identical to B   (from  3) 
5. A is not identical to B        (2 and 4) 
 
There are just three steps and a single premise to be defended here. If they are 
granted, we have the following result: supposing things to be indeterminately 
identical, we can conclude that they are distinct. The premise, (3), is supposed to be 
self-evident: everything is determinately self-identical. The step from (1)-(2) is a 
simple `property abstraction'; that is, an instance of the form:  
 
From:  F(N); infer N has the property Fness 
 
The step from (3)-(4) is not a simple property abstraction like that from (1)-(2). In (3)-
(4) the `abstraction' occurs within the scope of a negation. One might therefore 
describe it as an application of `generalized' property abstraction (property abstraction 
within the scope of an extensional operator). Or one might categorize it as a case of 
property instantiation:  
 
from N has the property Fness; infer F(N).  
 
Contraposing this, we have the move from ~F(N) to N failing to have the property of 
Fness.  
 
Finally, the step from (2) and (4) to the conclusion is, at heart, simply an application 
of the indiscernability of identicals: if things are identical, they must share the same 
properties; equivalently, if things differ in their properties, then they must be distinct. 
 
Given the economy of the argument, there are only a few ways of resisting. General 
methodological strictures restrict our room for maneuver further. I am interested in 
solutions that meet the following constraints: 
 
A. We should preserve classical logic. 
B. We should be prepared to take `properties' in a thin or merely abundant sense 
(cf. Lewis 1983). So even if there is no Armstrongian universal corresponding 
to `being identical with ‘A’, there is still (in standard cases) a property 
accurately so-described.  
C. Leibniz's law (the indiscernability of identicals) holds. 
D. The logic of `determinately' will be S5. A consequence of this is that if 
something is indeterminate, it is determinate that it is indeterminate.  
E. The solution should rescue ontically vague identity, not merely identity 
statements that are vague in virtue of semantic indecision or ignorance. 
 
These desiderata are enough to disqualify all the responses to Evans that I know of. I 
think that the desiderata are, individually and collectively, quite reasonable. I will 
briefly sketch some of my reasons here. 
 
On A. The constraint of preserving classical logic I put in for broadly methodological 
reasons. Classical logic gives rise to many puzzles when vagueness and indeterminacy 
are considered, but so do other logics. If many-valued logics, for example, gave a 
compelling or even a plausible analysis of vagueness and indeterminacy in general, 
one would have motivation to consider their application to the current situation. But I 
am convinced by the arguments in Williamson (1994, ch 4.) that we make no progress 
in the general case by adopting a many-valued approach.  Many-valued logics give 
rise to prima facie unacceptable results: for example, some contradictions will be less 
than completely false. Such worries would carry over to the ontic applications: see 
Williamson (2003a) for an explicit case against a `many valued' treatment of ontic 
vagueness. This constraint debars, for example, the defence of vague identity 
presented by Broome (1984) 
 
On B. The constraint that we take the property-talk in a `thin' sense seems obviously 
right to me. One should address the strongest form of the argument. The argument is 
at its strongest when `property' is taken in the thinnest sense compatible with the truth 
of Leibniz's law (notice that neither the premises nor the conclusions indulges in 
property-talk. Hence if there is any  reading of `property' on which the relevant moves 
are valid, we have a successful argument against vague identity). Here is one 
suggestion for getting a sense of the power of the argument. Let us regard ``the 
property of Fness'' as just a way of speaking plurally about things which are F (cf. 
Boolos 1984). Under this interpretation, (2) reads: A is one of the things that is 
indeterminately identical to B; and line (3) reads: B is not one of the things that is 
indeterminately identical to B. The plural reading of Leibniz's law is as compelling as 
the property-version, if not more so. The relevant claim is: if A and B are identical, 
and A is one of the Fs, then B is one of the Fs. 
 
On C. The indiscernability of identicals can seem an obvious truism. How could it 
possibly be that two things are the same (in the sense of being identical to one 
another) and yet different (in the sense of instantiating different properties)? Yet there 
are in philosophy a number of occasions on which Leibniz's law appears to be denied. 
 
Some of these are merely apparent. For example, failures of substitution in 
quotational and intentional contexts I do not count as genuine counterexamples, as (on 
my view) Leibniz's law is not to be formulated in terms of a substitution principle. To 
get a compelling counterexample to Leibniz's law, we should find de re predications 
which hold of A and not of B, when A and B are identical. The most plausible case of 
which I am aware concern de re modal predications. The statue and the clay are 
identical, it is claimed, yet the statue would be destroyed by deformation whereas the 
clay would not. I take it that David Lewis's counterpart theory of de re modality 
delivers exactly this result (for discussion, see Lewis (1986a, sec 4.5). Indeed, 
counterpart theory explains the apparent failure: the de re modal properties of a thing 
depend on what its counterparts are, and what its counterparts are depend on what 
similarities are being invoked. The concepts `statue' and `clay' raise to salience 
different aspects of similarity, and so, depending on which is mentioned, invoke 
different counterpart relations. 
 
There is a clear sense in which even counterpart theory does not involve us in a failure 
of Leibniz's law: rather, it points to the danger of systematic equivocation when using 
de re modal predications to argue for the distinctness of things. Qua statue, the lump 
of clay is destroyed by deformation. Qua lump, the statue can survive deformation. So 
even here I think Leibniz's law itself ultimately remains inviolate. 
 
The contrapositive of Leibniz's law seems as non-negotiable to me as Leibniz's law 
itself: if A is one of the F's, and B isn't, then A and B are distinct. This might follow 
automatically from Leibniz's law given our adherence to classical logic; but there are 
some subtleties hereabouts (cf. Williamson (1994, ch 5)). Since it is the 
contrapositive of Leibniz's law that is directly invoked in Evans' proof, let us make it 
explicit that it, too, is to be in force. I take this constraint to undermine the defence of 
vague identity in Parsons and Woodruff (1995). 
 
On D. The point of requiring the logic of `indeterminately' to be S5 is to disallow 
solutions that would exploit the a supposed consistency of `it is indeterminate whether 
(a=b) and not a=b' to resist Evans argument. (See Heck (1998) for a careful treatment 
of how to use this assumption to derive a contradiction from Evans' argument.) To 
begin with, if each putative case of vague identity is a case of distinctness, then the 
game is up anyway. There is no point in quibbling whether the refutation proceeds by 
deriving a contradiction from the supposition that vague identity occurs; or merely by 
pointing to an unsustainable feature of the philosophical position (viz. that each case 
of vague identity would have to be a case of distinctness). Furthermore, many of the 
cases where one might be tempted to think that identity is vague are cases where one 
will be equally tempted to think that it is determinately vague. For example, we shall 
shortly consider cases of vague survival: where it is purportedly vague whether Bob 
survives a massive character-destroying trauma. Bill (the person who emerges after 
the treatment) has enough bodily and psychological continuities with Bob to make the 
identity claim tenable, but not enough to make it a clear case of survival. It seems to 
me to that if one wishes to say that ``Bill=Bob'' is ontically indeterminate, 
then it will be a clear case of ontic indeterminacy. So it is a constraint on a good 
solution will be that it work under the S5 hypothesis. 
 
Heck himself argues that the operator cannot be assumed to have an S5 logic and 
explores what sort of picture of ontically vague identity might therefore be left open 
by the Evans argument. My constraint rules out this line of response. 
 
This just leaves one constraint to be argued for, (E): that the solution should not make 
the vagueness of the identity a matter of mere `semantic indecision'. This will be 
important to what follows, so I discuss it in more detail. 
 
 
Resisting Evans via referential indeterminacy 
 
The following statement is true:3  
 
(*) It is contingent whether the number of planets is eight 
  
However, it does not follow from (*) that there is some object which satisfies:   
 
(**) is one of the things which are contingently identical to eight. 
 
                                                 
3 The following presentation draws on Lewis (1988). 
 Indeed, on standard (Kripkean) assumptions there is no object that satisfies that 
predicate. The point is that `the number of the planets' picks out different objects in 
different situations, and you need this kind of variability to get (*) to come out true. 
Basically, you can only safely move from (*) to the claim that something satisfies 
(**) if nothing funny is going on with the reference relation: if the name picks out the 
same thing with respect to every world. 
 
The parallel to the Evans case is this. Just because we have:  
 
It is indeterminate whether Sue=Sandy 
 
It does not immediately follow that there is some object which satisfies:  
 
is one of things which is indeterminately identical to Sandy 
 
We need some further guarantee that `indeterminately' and `Sue' don't interact in the 
way that `contingently' and `the number of the planets' do in the Quinean 
case.  
 
I've described this all quite abstractly, and filling out the details here would require us 
to talk in detail about how we are going to handle the operator `determinately'. 
However, what I'm interested in is a move made in support of Evans, that aims to rule 
out concerns on this point. That is the idea that we can stipulate that no `spooky stuff' 
is going on with the names such as `Sue' and `Sally'. In the modal context, the idea is 
familiar and widely accepted: names such as `Sue' are supposed to rigidly designate 
their referents, unlike definite descriptions such as `the number of planets'. In the 
context of vagueness, the analogous property is that of referential determinacy: the 
idea that if `Sue' in any sense refers to an object O, then it determinately refers to O. 
 
(I speak in this way in order to avoid commitment to an analysis of `determinately'. If 
we drop this non-committal stance, say in favour of a supervaluational treatment of 
indeterminacy, we can make the analogy more exact. Non-rigidity is a matter of 
referring to different things at different worlds. Referential indeterminacy would be a 
matter of referring to different things at different sharpenings of the language.) 
 
I do not see why the sort of reasons that led people to think that ordinary proper 
names were rigid should lead one to impose the constraint that proper names must be 
referentially determinate. Thinking that there is referential indeterminacy in ordinary 
names seems to me a perfectly reasonable theoretical option. Suppose that we use 
`Kilimanjaro', for example, in such a way that all our claims would be made-true by 
assigning any one of a number of agglomerations of rock as the referent of 
`Kilimanjaro'. Ex hypothesi, no one of these appears better placed, metaphysically or 
in point of fitting linguistic usage, to be the unique referent of that term. All else 
equal, it is quite plausible that the name will be referentially indeterminate between 
these `Kilimanjaro candidates'. This would be `semantic indecision', and it leads to 
referential indeterminacy. 
 
To finish the example, let us name a particular one of the Kilimanjaro candidates K1. 
It will be indeterminate whether Kilimanjaro is K1; but there is nothing that is 
indeterminately identical to K1. To think this follows from the preceding claim is 
to make exactly the Quinean fallacy. 
 
To sum up: the received view, I am taking it, is that there is a perfectly reasonable 
way of resisting Evans' argument against vague identity statements, by analogy to the 
response to the Quinean attack on modality. This reasonable response involves 
thinking of names as referentially indeterminate. But the only case for referential 
indeterminacy we have seen is one where the referential indeterminacy arises from so-
called `semantic indecision': the world itself being perfectly precise, but our linguistic 
practices not being such as to fix a single determinate reference for our terms.4
 
The constraint that we not exploit semantic indecision in this way to resist Evans' 
argument is based simply on a concern to avoid changing the subject. Evans' 
argument is explicitly concerned with the hypothesis that world itself might be vague. 
If the only way that we can escape refutation is by pointing to non-ontic sources of 
indeterminacy, then we have conceded the main point. 
 
With the constraints in place and justified, the Evans argument looks in good shape. 
The question then arises: why shouldn't we simply endorse it? What is at stake that 
might force us to take a deeper interest in resisting the argument? 
 
2. The significance of ontically vague identity 
 
What is at stake? I 
 
The tenability of ontically vague identity might initially seem an abstract question. 
But it has deep significance, in two ways. First, it has direct practical and ethical 
implications. Second, it has deep theoretical significance within metaphysics. 
 
Vague identity has practical and ethical significance when we consider cases of vague 
survival. After massive trauma, or tremendous psychological change over time, it may 
not be clear to us whether the person inhabiting a body prior to the trauma or change 
is the same person as the one inhabiting the body after the trauma or psychological 
change. Likewise, it might be unclear to us whether a fertilized egg, or a foetus, is 
identical to the baby born eight months later. The identity claims in each case are at 
the heart of moral evaluations: if you think that the fertilized egg or the foetus could 
survive as a baby (rather than merely `give rise' to one) then there is a prima facie 
case that abortion is killing a person. Imprisoning an old man for crimes committed in 
`his' youth, may be just or unjust according to whether he really is the same person as 
the one who committed those crimes.  
 
There are views on personal identity which would not allow my case to be set up. On 
some views, a fertilized egg may be identical with a baby, and yet the latter but not 
the former is a `person' and thus a morally significant individual. 5 On some views, 
bodily continuity ensures that the old man is identical to the criminal; though it 
doesn't settle the question of whether he is `the same person' in a morally significant 
                                                 
4 The line of resistance is described by Noonan (1982). Noonan does not confuse it with a defense of 
ontically vague identity 
5 See Olson (1999) for a view on which one might be identical to a foetus while that foetus fails to be a 
person. See also Olson, passim, for scepticism about the moral significance of diachronic identity 
claims.  
sense. My point is only that there are a large range of perfectly natural views on 
which evaluation of the identity is morally central.  
 
A natural view here seems to be that it is vague whether or not the fertilized egg is 
identical to the baby; but not vague in virtue of epistemic limitations or semantic 
indecision, but rather vague in virtue of ontic unsettledness. Those resisting the ontic 
characterization have to explain how anything ethically `deep' could turn on (for 
example) the linguistic and epistemic issues at the heart of rival treatments of 
vagueness.  
 
Another potentially significant case of vague identity occurs with `fission' scenarios. 
Suppose my brain is split in two, and the halves implanted into two new bodies, 
giving rise (apparently) to two viable persons, psychologically continuous with me. 
Which, if either, inherits my fortune? Who is punished for my crimes? What should 
my girlfriend think? As Parfit (1984, ch.12) urges, it is hard to maintain that I survive 
as both individuals: if I am identical to both, shouldn't they be identical to each other 
by elementary formal properties of identity?6 Again, a natural proposal is to think that 
in such a case I survive, but there is no fact of the matter concerning which of the 
subsequent individuals I survive as. A natural proposal, but one that appears 
unavailable if Evans' argument works. 
 
What is at stake? II 
 
So far, I have just described a class of pratically and ethically significant cases where 
ontically vague identity would appear prima facie a natural and important descriptive 
option. I now turn to a wider theoretical significance. I shall argue first, that rejecting 
ontic vagueness in general commits one to a substantive metaphysical results; and 
second, that on certain modest assumptions, Evans argument against ontically vague 
identities rules out ontic vagueness more generally. 
 
Following Barnes 2005, consider some property that isn’t at the ultimate 
microphysical level, Uranium say. Something gets to be Uranium when it is a cluster 
of smaller particles appropriately arranged. Is being Uranium one of the primitive 
ways that things can be (is there an Armstrongian Universal of Uranium)?  Or should 
the primitive description of the world simply list the arrangements of quarks and 
leptons at the ultimate microphysical level, and regard it as a semantic matter when 
those arrangements count as Uranium?  
 
Intuitively it can be a vague matter at a given moment whether some cluster of 
particles is Uranium  (consider cases where the Uranium atom is in the process of 
undergoing radioactive decay, but at a point where it is unclear whether or not it has 
decayed).  So take an A such that it is vague whether A is Uranium. Is this a matter of 
semantic vagueness? That is an appealing option if we go for the microphysicalist 
thought that a description of the world at the ultimate microphysical level exhausts the 
distribution of primitive properties across the world, for then whether A is Uranium 
can be identified with the question of whether A is in an arrangement that does 
enough to fall under the word “Uranium”. But if being Uranium was a primitive way 
                                                 
6 Though see Lewis (1976) and Sider (1996) for proposals for 
defending this `double survival' view. The puzzle is sharpest for an endurantist theory of persistence. 
something could be, we couldn’t take this line. If it is vague whether A is Uranium, it 
is on this view vague whether the metaphysically primitive ways that A is, includes 
being Uranium. There seems no room to wriggle out of this by appeal to semantic 
phenomena. What goes for Uranium, of course, goes in spades for other kinds in 
which we might take a metaphysical interest: being a person; being water; being 
conscious. In each case, there is the microphysicalist line that these do not correspond 
to primitive ways the world can be, but are rather ways of classifying situations that 
can be exhaustively described ultimately in terms of a distribution of micro-
properties. That allows any vagueness in whether something has these properties to be 
construed as a matter of semantic vagueness. But prima facie we cannot appeal to 
such considerations if any of these macro-properties are to be admitted to our 
metaphysic on a par with micro-properties.  
 
If one regards Uranium, or water, or consciousness, or being a person, as among the 
perfectly natural properties (in the sense of Lewis (1983)), then one might still avoid 
ontic vagueness by taking there to be – against appearances – sharp boundaries to the 
application of such properties. Consider a “sorites series” of arrangements of 
particles, going from clear cases of Uranium through successive stages of radioactive 
decay to clear cases of non-Uranium. Perhaps there is some – presumably 
metaphysically brute – cut-off in the series, dividing the cases of Uranium to non-
Uranium. Such metaphysical brutalism might be still be consistent with an epistemic 
account of the vagueness of the property being Uranium.7 If one is not to be a 
brutalist, then I do not see any way to avoid regarding the vagueness of whether or not 
something is Uranium in appropriate cases, as being an instance of ontic vagueness.  
 
If the domain of the perfectly natural extends beyond the microphysical to 
paradigmatic macro-properties, then prima facie we are faced with a choice between 
brutalism and ontic vagueness. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that those such as 
van Inwagen who take properties as being alive with great metaphysical seriousness, 
also buy into ontic vagueness. Turning this around, if we had decisive arguments 
against ontic vagueness, and we regard brutalism as beyond the pale, then a 
microphysicalist account of which properties are perfectly natural seems the obvious 
way to go. (It remains to be seen, of course, whether even this sort of view can avoid 
ontic vagueness, but prominent defenders such as Lewis are explicitly committed to 
avoiding such vagueness, and we have as yet no prima facie reason to doubt this.) 
 
This is one illustration of the way that rejecting ontic vagueness would constrain 
one’s overall metaphysics. There are many others, and contemporary debate in 
metaphysics provides us with explicit illustrations. Lewis (1986a, pp.212-13) 
famously argues for mereological universalism on the grounds that non-crazy 
alternative composition principles would lead to ontic vagueness, which should be 
rejected. Sider (2001) argues for the existence of instantaneous temporal parts along 
much the same lines. A principled argument against ontic vagueness would be a 
powerful tool in the metaphysician’s armoury.  
 
Interconnections between types of ontic vagueness 
 
                                                 
7 For brutalism, see Markosian (1988) (Markosian discusses the particular case of brutalism about 
composition). 
To argue that vague identity (ontically construed) is incoherent, is not yet to say that 
all ontic vagueness is incoherent. What of vague existence, or vague instantiation of 
universals? What of vague location, vague part-hood, vague constitution? Perhaps we 
can have a non-microphysicalist metaphysic, shot through with ontic vagueness, but 
steering clear of ontically vague identity that would lead us into the problems that 
Evans' argument illustrates.  For all that the Evans argument against ontically vague 
identity directly implies, all these other kinds of ontic vagueness could still be 
coherent. Thus Noonan (2004, p.131):  
 
Everyone knows that Evans's argument against vague identity in-the-world 
doesn't show that there aren't vague objects. Even if the argument succeeds all 
it proves is that every vague object is determinately distinct from every precise 
object and every other vague object 
 
Akiba (2000) develops an account of vague objects that is supposed to avoid vague 
identities. I want to argue that the claim Noonan takes to be common ground is highly 
problematic: powerful considerations suggest that vague objects, insofar as they exist 
vaguely, and vaguely instantiate properties, give rise to ontically vague identities. If 
so, then the believer in vague objects must take seriously Evans's attack. As shall 
emerge, however, I think that Evans's argument is resistible in these cases. 
 
We shall be investigating the relationships among these kinds of ontic vagueness. 
This is an under-explored area, but I will give two arguments that convert vague 
existence into vague identity, and vague instantiation of a property into vague 
existence. If these are successful, then any metaphysical picture that is committed to 
vague existence or vague instantiation will be convicted of incoherence by the Evans 
argument. 
 
The following considerations convert cases of vague existence into a case of ontically 
vague identity. (They are based on an argument in Hawley (2001). She presents this 
as an argument throwing into question the universal applicability of standard axioms 
of set-theory. What follows, by contrast, presupposes that the standard axioms of set 
theory (with urrelemente) hold quite generally.) 
 
Suppose that it is vague whether A exists, for A something other than a set. Now 
consider the set of all non-sets. (To secure the existence of this set, using the standard 
set-theoretic axioms, we need to presume that there is a set containing as many things 
as there are non-sets. Let that assumption be made.) Call this B. Now consider the set 
of all non-sets which are not identical to A. Call this C. Is it the case that B=C? They 
differ, if at all, only in whether they include A. By the extensionality axiom of set 
theory, therefore, they will be distinct if and only if A exists. Since it is vague whether 
this is the case, it is vague whether the sets mentioned are identical. 
 
Once one has seen the structure, one can run parallel arguments with other materials. 
For example, presuppose classical extensional mereology, and consider the fusion of 
everything whatsoever. Call this B'. Now consider the fusion of everything that is not 
identical to A. Call this C'. Is it the case that B'=C'? By the extensionality of 
mereology, they will be distinct if and only if A exists. Since it is vague whether the 
latter is the case, it is vague whether the mereological sums mentioned are identical. 
 
Barnes (2005) argues that many cases of ontic vagueness will give rise to vague 
existence, given an appropriate realist property and fact ontologies. If it is vague 
whether A instantiates F-ness, then it is vague whether the state of affairs A being F 
exists. If A is the only candidate for being F, then on an Aristotelian theory of 
universals, it will be vague whether F-ness itself exists. 
 
So vagueness in instantiation leads to vague existence (modulo an appropriate 
metaphysics of properties and facts). And by Hawley's argument, this leads to vague 
identity. Ontically vague identity is thus a keystone: removing it will remove many 
kinds of ontic vagueness; and the metaphysical results mentioned earlier will follow. 
 
3. A loophole in Evans' argument 
 
With the stakes raised, let us now return to consider whether any escape route is left, 
or whether, granted my constraints, the Evans argument succeeds. There is little room 
for manoeuvre. Given an S5 treatment of indeterminacy, once we reach (5), the game 
is over. Given classical logic and Leibniz's law, if we reach each of (2) and (4), we are 
in no position to resist the conclusion. Since rejecting the premise (1) would be to 
concede the point, there seem to be but two options: to reject premise (3), or to reject 
the abstraction steps. (Barnes (ms.) explores one further option: to diagnose an 
ambiguity in the argument in the way that counterpart theorists would do to analogous 
Leibniz law arguments involving modals. I won’t consider this further here.) 
 
I cannot imagine what it would be to reject premise (3), if it is read (as intended) de 
dicto. So we are left with the abstraction steps. Can these be resisted? 
 
One way of resisting them is to invoke a heavyweight property ontology, and 
proclaim bafflement at `properties' specified in terms of identity, or in terms of the 
notion of determinacy. But we have resolved to treat property-talk in a lightweight 
way, perhaps rephrasing matters in terms of plurals. So this option is closed. 
 
Given this, how could we resist the abstraction steps? As described earlier, there is a 
presumption in the literature that resistance at this stage, once issues about robust 
property ontology are cleared away, would be to miss Evans’ point.  
 
I think this presumption contains one right thought and one wrong thought. The right 
thought can be articulated as follows: 
 
(^) Unless `a' or `b' are referentially indeterminate, then each of the following 
hold:  
o from it being indeterminate whether a is identical to b, it follows that a 
has the property of being indeterminately identical to b. 
o from a having the property of being indeterminately identical to b, it 
follows that it is indeterminate that a is identical to b. 
 
The wrong thought, I claim, is the following: 
 
(^^) If `a' is referentially indeterminate, then it is so in virtue of semantic 
indecision. 
 
Given our ground-clearing work, I know of no way to explain a failure (1)-(2) or (3)-
(4) steps unless one invokes referential indeterminacy, so I grant (^). Given this, any 
way of resisting Evans must diagnose semantic indeterminacy. If we have (^^), then 
the case against ontically vague identity is closed. If the only way to resist the 
argument is to resist the abstraction moves, and (granted (^) and (^^)) this involves 
diagnosing semantic indecision in one of the terms involved, have we not shown that 
any way of resisting Evans at this point will violate our last---and perhaps least 
negotiable---constraint? For now it seems that to avoid the result we are left appealing 
to semantic, rather than ontic, indeterminacy in diagnosing the source of the 
vagueness of the relevant identity statement. 
 
 
Referential indeterminacy without semantic indecision. 
 
It seems to me that there is a perfectly sensible view of ontic vagueness which gives 
rise to vague identity statements, and for which the appropriate response to the Evans 
argument is to point to referential indeterminacy in the names. Though I concede (^), 
I reject (^^). I shall argue below that there is a theoretical gap here which the believer 
in ontically vague identities can exploit.8  
 
A disclaimer however: I do not wish to defend the view that there could be vague 
instances of the identity relation. Rather, I am aiming to defend the view that there 
might be vague identity statements arising in virtue of ontic vagueness. One might 
think that Evans argument should be directed only against the stronger claim. 
However, to argue this way would be to give up on our reasons to be interested in the 
Evans argument. It seemed significant because there were many cases where there 
were prima facie vague identities (in cases of psychological change, or foetus 
development, or fission) where it seems the indeterminate identity is not a mere 
matter of semantic indecision, but is rather due to worldly indeterminacy. Likewise, it 
seemed significant because vague existence and vague instantiation can be argued to 
give rise to vague identities; and again, semantic indecision cannot be the culprit in 
such cases. In each case, the important thing is whether there can be ontically vague 
identity, understood as an identity statement which is vague in virtue of ontic 
indeterminacy. To make the Evans argument significant, we should interpret it as 
attempting to establish that ontically vague identity in this wide sense is incoherent. 
 
How might we defend the claim that there can be ontically vague identities, in this 
sense? The basic thought is the following. The reference relation is the joint upshot of 
what we do to fix the meanings of words, and the way that the world is. To see how 
this can surface within a theory of reference, consider an analogy to cases of 
reference-failure. For the sake of argument, suppose that one of the things we have to 
do in order to refer to a thing is to acquire a capacity to perceptually recognise that 
thing again under a range of circumstances. Some attempts to introduce a name 
referring to an object might then fail, not because the world isn't cooperating, but 
                                                 
8 This move is not without precedent in the literature: see for example Parsons & Woodruff (1995, s.6). 
Their reasons for questioning the distinction are rather different from mine, however. Lowe (1999, 
p.329) sketches a route from vague identity to referential indeterminacy that I would look to describe in 
the framework which follows, though it is not clear to me that he would be happy with this 
representation of what he is doing (and in particular, with my giving up on vagueness in the identity 
relation itself).  
because we have not done our part. One might think this about Evans' purported 
`descriptive name', Julius. Since the name is supposedly introduced as the unique 
satisfier of a purely general description (the inventor of the zipper), our ability to use 
that word is unaccompanied by any perceptual capacity to recognize the supposed 
referent. On the other hand, there are cases where we seem to have done our part 
correctly, but where we fail to refer to anything because the world isn't cooperating. 
Think of Macbeth's demonstrative that dagger, for example. 
 
What happens with reference-failure can in principle happen with referential 
indeterminacy. The usual examples of referentially indeterminate words (`mass'9, `the 
square root of minus one'10, `Kilimanjaro'11) are presented as cases where our 
reference-fixing actions have failed to home-in on one amongst a range of candidate 
referents. Perhaps, even, there is some in principle obstacle to our doing so. These are 
cases where we have referential indeterminacy in virtue of semantic indecision. 
 
We can envisage a different case. This is where we, as language-users, have done our 
part of the bargain, but where because of worldly indeterminacy, we do not secure a 
determinate referent. At the moment, this is only an in principle possibility. But in 
what follows, I shall argue for a way of viewing ontic indeterminacy on which this 
kind of referential indeterminacy will occur, and give rise to vague identity 
statements. 
 
4. A framework for ontic vagueness 
 
I will not give here a constitutive account of ontic indeterminacy: a story which would 
tell someone what ontic indeterminacy is. What I will tell you is one way in which 
ontic indeterminacy surfaces---in particular, how it surfaces within one’s account of 
modality and possible worlds. The account of ontic indeterminacy that I favour is in 
one sense schematic. It treats as primitive a certain notion, and is thus compatible with 
a variety of accounts that might try to further analyze or reduce that notion. Despite 
this, we shall have all the resources we need to describe situations where ontically 
vague identities arise, in a way which is immune to Evans' argument. 
 
Indeterminate Actuality12
 
One aspect of extant theories of possible worlds is that they almost invariably take 
there to be a single, determinate actual world. Thinking of possible worlds, as Lewis 
(1986a) does, as extended concrete objects of the same kind, and `existing' in the 
same  way as us and our surroundings, this seems a natural result. For the actual world 
is then just that concrete object which contains as parts we ourselves (this naturally 
leads to the thought that phrases such as `actually' function as indexicals). The case is 
not totally conclusive; since it supposes that we ourselves occupy only a single 
possible world (Akiba (2004) exploits this loophole.) However, I leave this aside for 
                                                 
9 Field (1973) 
10 Brandom (1996) 
11 McGee (1997) 
12 This section is especially indebted to discussions with Elizabeth Barnes, who has been developing 
independently a similar position, albeit differing on some details. Many of the ideas here expressed 
owe a lot to discussions with her. 
the moment, since I will take it that not many friends of possible worlds will endorse 
Lewisian `genuine modal realism' (GMR). 
 
If GMR is to be abandoned, what do we replace it with? Abstractionist theories of 
possible worlds are a natural starting point. For example, some think of possible 
worlds as maximal properties that reality as a whole may instantiate. Many of these 
world-properties are uninstantiated, and these correspond to non-actual possibilities. 
On other conceptions, worlds are some kind of abstract constructs (perhaps set-
theoretic entities or world-descriptions); or perhaps they are to be thought of as big 
`images' of possible worlds. 
 
Let a thousand flowers bloom: I do not wish to take a stance at this point. What is 
important for my purposes here is that on such views, the reality we inhabit is not 
itself a possible world. Rather, one among the possible worlds corresponds to reality, 
and that world-property, construction, image or whatever will be the surrogate for 
reality within the space of possible worlds. Sometimes the terminology of `actual 
world' (for reality) vs. `actualized world' (for its surrogate) is used to mark this 
distinction; I mark the same distinction by using the word `actuality' for the privileged 
member of the set of possible worlds), and the word `reality' for us and our 
surroundings. I am tempted by the view that reality is a totality of states of affairs, 
along the lines of Armstrong (1997). 
 
How are we to think of this `correspondence' relation? Is it sui generis or can it be 
explained in other terms? That is a central question of modal metaphysics. For one 
who identifies worlds with world-properties, then it is natural to think that to be 
actual, a maximal world-property must be instantiated – perhaps it needs to be 
instantiated by the whole of reality, rather than just a part. For one who identifies 
worlds with images, then to be actual a world must optimally resemble reality. And so 
on and so forth. Of course, on some conceptions, the relation will indeed be sui 
generis: consider for example `magical ersatzism' (Lewis 1986a, sec. 3.4): 
`correspondence' can be understood as the inverse of Lewis’s `selection'. 
 
The real point here is that many questions remain open about the nature of this 
`correspondence' relation. In particular, there is a potential gap between the claim that 
we inhabit a single reality, and the claim that there is a single `actualized' world. 
Prima facie, many distinct world-properties could be instantiated by reality; many of 
the images may depict reality equally well. On a `sui generis' approach to 
correspondence, why not think that this sui generis relation is many-one? The idea 
that there is a single actual world now needs argument: I contend that no general 
argument for this conclusion is available.  
 
Let me tie this down in a particular case: we shall take possible worlds to be maximal 
precise world-properties. If reality is vague, then presumably it is vague which precise 
world property is instantiated. Let us now define `w corresponds to reality' as w is not 
determinately uninstantiated, and say that the world is an actuality when it 
corresponds to reality in this sense. Notice we use the notion `determinately' in 
defining actuality. This would undermine an ambition to use this characterization to 
reductively define the notion `determinately' via modal metaphysics. But as flagged 
early, the ambition here is not to reduce ontic vagueness, but only to develop a 
framework for theorizing about it. (Though I need only take the notion as a working 
primitive here, I think one attractive “null” option for a constitutive account of 
vagueness would claim that this sort of operator is a metaphysical primitive, just as 
some would claim that a possibility operator is a metaphysical primitive.) 
 
Given the above, ontic indeterminacy will surface in multiple worlds being actual. We 
can exploit this to give coherent descriptions of particular cases of ontic vagueness. If 
it is indeterminate whether A exists, then there is an actuality where A exists and an 
actuality where it doesn't: it will be vague whether the exact total world property that 
is instantiated is one that says that A exists; or rather one that says that says that A 
fails to exist. If it is vague whether A is located at L1 or L2, then there are actualities 
where it is located at each of those places. 
 
This framework allows us to give a systematic account of what truths obtain at a 
vague reality. A sentence will be true (simpliciter) just in case it is true relative to all 
the actual worlds. Let me give just one example: there may be no fact of the matter 
where the object A is exactly located, as it is located in one place at one actual world 
and at another place in another. Despite this, there can be a fact of the matter that it is 
located within the dining room, since its location at every actual world falls within 
that area.  
 
The framework is strongly analogous to supervaluational treatments of semantic 
indeterminacy. There are other options to be considered within the ersatz worlds 
framework: see Barnes (ms) for discussion of one such. In respect of resembling 
supervaluationism, the framework developed here resembles that put forward by 
Akiba (2004) as an account of ontic vagueness. The overall packages, however, are 
quite different: Akiba’s `ontic sharpenings' are slices of a quasi-temporal dimension 
of reality; whereas I find a place for them within an ersatz theory of possible worlds.  
 
5. Application to vague identities 
 
A natural thought dismissed 
 
Once one has the machinery of multiple actualities on the table, a natural approach to 
purported cases of vague identity suggests itself. According to this line, ontically 
vague identity is a matter of two objects being identical at some actuality, and distinct 
at another. 
 
However, this kind of claim is not obviously coherent. If identity across worlds is 
truly a species of identity, then surely it must at least be transitive and symmetric. But 
then if A and B are identical at world w1, and A is identical to C at world w2, and B 
is identical to D at w2, then C and D must themselves be identical. 
 
Some deny that ``transworld identity'' is a species of identity. Some instead would 
analyze it instead terms of similarity relations between world-bound objects---objects 
have representatives at other worlds even though strictly speaking they don't exist 
there. Such a `counterpart theory' may allow objects to have multiple counterparts at a 
given world, without there being any pressure to identify those objects, or even say 
that they are counterparts of one another. I am not opposed in principle to counterpart 
theory, and it may be that a counterpart-theoretic treatment does indeed allow us to 
sustain the natural thought voiced at the beginning of this section (cf. Barnes (ms)). If 
so, perhaps I could rest my case. But two factors incline me to say more:  
 
• Neutrality here is a virtue: if at all possible it is best not to take a stance on 
counterpart theory vs. genuine transworld identity. 
• One may reasonably insist that the identity statements at issue in Evans proof 
be understood as making reference to strict identity (the counterpart theorist 
has no reason to regard this stricture as illegitimate). The question then arises 
as to whether the Evans argument works in that context. 
 
I wish, therefore, to explore what one should say to one who will not countenance 
failures of transitivity or symmetry in transworld identity. The natural thought is then 
unavailable. Ontically vague identity statements cannot involve a pair of objects being 
identical at one world and distinct at another. 
 
 
Referential indeterminacy in virtue of ontic indeterminacy: the case of fission 
 
Given the current picture of ontic indeterminacy, the question that we should ask is: 
what are the "sharpenings" of reality (the ``actualities'') between which reality fails to 
select? Let us focus for the time being on a particular purported case of vague 
identity: that of the fission of an enduring object. Let us suppose that a particular 
amoeba, Sue, splits into two `daughter' amoebas. Call them Sally and Sandy, 
respectively. After the fissioning event, Sally wanders off to the west, and Sandy to 
the east. 
 
We want to defend a description of this fissioning event as one where: 
a. Sue survives past the fission event 
b. It is indeterminate whether she survives as Sally or as Sandy 
c. This indeterminacy is a matter of ontic unsettledness, rather than semantic 
indecision or epistemic limitations. 
 
 Two relevant candidates to `correspond' to the actual world, therefore, are:  
 
A.  a world where Sue survives as the amoeba who wanders off to the west after 
the fissioning event (i.e. Sue survives under the name `Sandy'). A new, distinct 
amoeba is created at the fissioning event and wanders off to the east: this 
amoeba gains the name `Sally'.  
B. a world where Sue survives as the amoeba who wanders off to the east after 
the fissioning event (i.e. Sue survives under the name `Sally'). A new, distinct 
amoeba is created at the fissioning event and wanders off to the west: this 
amoeba gains the name `Sandy'. 
 
 Diagrammatically, we can represent the situation as shown in figure 1. For the sake 
of simplicity, I shall assume the following transworld identity facts: that the amoebas 
that survive the fissioning event in their respective world are identical, and that the 
amoebas who are created by the fissioning event in their respective world are 
identical.  
 
 
Figure 1: Referential indeterminacy in fission cases 
 
The name `Sue' suffers no referential indeterminacy. In each case, it refers to the 
surviving amoeba. However, ``Sally'' picks out the surviving amoeba in one world, 
and the newly minted amoeba in the other. The name ``Sandy'' suffers exactly 
analogous referential indeterminacy.  
 
How does this referential indeterminacy arise? Not from any failure on our part. 
Metaphysically, we are supposing that it is indeterminate what the location is of the 
surviving amoeba (Sue) after the fissioning event. Since we introduce the names 
``Sandy'' and ``Sally'' (in part) by pointing to an amoeba at a certain location, this 
ontic indeterminacy induces referential indeterminacy. The (ontically based) 
referential indeterminacy induces a vague identity statement. ``Sue=Sandy'' is true at 
one actual world, but false at the other. So, overall, it is indeterminate in status. 
 
(Alternative assumptions about transworld identities are no doubt possible. For 
example, we could assume that in each case the amoeba that wanders west is the 
same, and the amoeba that in each case the amoeba that wanders east is the same. In 
such a scenario, which names are referentially indeterminate will vary: “Sue” will be 
referentially indeterminate, while each of “Sandy” and “Sally” will be referentially 
determinate. The fundamental point is that no matter how we assign transworld 
identities, we’ll never get a vague identity statement where both the terms flanking the 
identity are referentially determinate).13  
 
                                                 
13 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out the range of options here. 
Let us see what we should say about the relevant instance of the Evans argument: 
 
1. It is indeterminate whether Sue is identical to Sandy   (premise) 
2. Sue has the property of being indeterminately identical to Sandy  (from 1) 
3. It is not indeterminate whether Sandy is identical to Sandy (premise.) 
4. Sandy does not have the property of being indeterminately identical to Sandy (from 
(3)). 
5. Sue is not identical to Sandy     (from (2) and (4)) 
 
Given our assumptions about transworld identity, we have no need to quarrel with the 
premises or the step from (1) to (2) (the name ``Sue'' referring to the same amoeba on 
each candidate world). On the other hand, ``Sandy'' is referentially indeterminate: in 
one actuality it picks out Sue, and in the other actuality, it picks out the new amoeba. 
(3) is true, for no matter which world we consider, whatever ``Sandy'' picks out is 
self-identical. Yet (4) is false; there is no object which both is identical to what 
``Sandy'' picks out in world A, and identical to what ``Sandy'' picks out in world B. 
Thus, the move from (3) to (4) fails. Because this is an instance of referential 
indeterminacy, there is no mystery as to why it fails---it is simply the kind of Quinean 
failure for which we already have precedent. Yet this is not a case of mere semantic 
indecision: the indeterminacy arises because a particular feature of reality (the 
location of Sandy) is ontically unsettled. 
 
 
Extension to other cases 
 
I claim that a similar story can be told in all the other significant cases of vague 
identity. In the paradigmatic survival cases, the world may be indeterminate between 
(A) a world where there is a single individual who survives to old age; and (B) a 
world where the individual is at some point destroyed by psychological change, and 
replaced by a new individual. When we point to the old man in the dock, our 
demonstrative `that man' will be referentially indeterminate between these two. 
 
The cases of ontically vague identities arising from vague existence are another case 
in point. To take the example of Hawley (2002), consider the organicist view of Van 
Inwagen (1990): a collection of cat-parts compose a cat if and only if they are caught 
up in a life. Take a case where a cat is dying; and an instant where it is (ontically) 
indeterminate whether it is alive or dead. A macroscopic object exists, lying on the 
mat, if and only if the cat is alive. The latter is vague; so it is vague whether a 
macroscopic object exists there. On our view, we say that there it is indeterminate 
which of two worlds is actual: one where there only cat parts on the mat (the cat is 
dead); and a second where these compose a live cat. 
 
Consider, then, the phrase `the set of everything on the mat'. In one world, this picks 
out all and only the cat-parts. In the other world, this picks out all the cat-parts, 
together with the cat. If sets are individuated by their members, then these are distinct 
sets, so in our scenario `the set of everything on the mat' is referentially indeterminate. 
We can accept, therefore, that vague existence leads to ontically vague identities; but 
again, the Evans argument will fail since the ontic vagueness is manifested in 
referential indeterminacy. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
I have given arguments that cases of ontically vague identity are of interest in 
themselves, and are of strategic importance to foundational questions of metaphysics. 
We have seen arguments that if ontically vague identity is given up, many other forms 
of ontic vagueness fall too: in particular, vague existence and vague instantiation. 
Evans' arguments, if they succeed, thus establish deeply significant results. 
 
Traditional responses to Evans have too high a cost; being logically reversionary or 
otherwise objectionable. I contend that the only reasonable way to resist the 
arguments is to diagnose referential indeterminacy. However, this is not to give up on 
ontically vague identity, on the understanding of that notion that it must have to 
possess the strategic significance just described.  
 
There is just a single Reality that includes us and our surroundings. Nevertheless, 
most plausible theories of modality and possible worlds leave room for this single 
reality to be represented by a multitude of possible worlds that `correspond to' reality 
to exactly the same extent. These are the multiple actualities. This then allows us to 
formulate descriptions of ontic vagueness in ways that both vindicate ontically vague 
identities, and allows us to diagnose exactly where Evans' argument against this 
possibility breaks down. 
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